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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
148 Pac. 937. Ariz. Rev. Code 1928 sec. 1521; approved in Brought v.
Howard (1926) 30 Ariz. 522, 249 Pac. 76; Gold v. Killeen (1934) 33 Pac.
(2d) 595, 94 A. L. R. 448. The statutes of these two states differ from the
New York act only in specifying that the contingency is the "lifetime of
the promisor" whereas the New York law provides more broadly for "a
lifetime."
Prior to the enactment of the amendment there had been two conflicting
lines of decisions in New York. One line approved the general rule. Mc-
Kinney v. McClaskey (1879) 76 N. Y. 594; Kent v. Kent, supra; Gallagher
v. Finch, Pruyn & Co. (1925) 207 N. Y. Supp. 403. The other view did not
consider death so "time destroying" and personal covenants for a period of
over one year were held to be within the statute. McGirr v. Campbell
(1902) 75 N. Y. Supp. 571; Shapiro v. Balavan (1924) 205 N. Y. Supp. 208.
The utility of the new provision will depend largely upon the application
it receives at the hands of the courts. The judges in applying the provision
should keep in mind the original purpose of the statute of frauds, i. e., to
prevent frauds and perjuries, and no provision, old or new, should be so
construed as to provide an avenue of escape from the fundamental principle
of justice.
W. F. '37.
TAXATION-EQuAL PROTECTION-GRADUATED GRoss SALEs TAx.-Plain-
tiffs, a domestic corporation and a domestic partnership, each operating a de-
partment store in Louisville, a Dela ware corporation having 21 department
stores in Kentucky, and an Ohio corporation (Kroger Stores, Inc.) maintain-
ing 289 grocery stores in the Commonwealth, brought bills in the United
States District Court of Kentucky to enjoin the state officers from enforcing
an act of that Commonwealth (Ky. Acts of 1930, c. 149, p. 475) which pur-
ported to impose on all "retail merchants" an "annual license tax for the
opening, establishing, operating, or maintaining of any store or stores .... "
Sec. 2 of the act provided for a graduation of the rate of the tax in eight
steps, from 1/20 of one percent on the first $400,000, to 1 percent on the
excess of gross sales over $1,000,000, the increased rates being applicable,
however, only in respect of sales in each successive bracket. By definition
the act provided that all department and chain store systems be considered
as single units for the purpose of the tax, and expressly exempted sales of
farm and gardening products by the producers thereof. Plaintiffs charged
that the classification in the act denied them the equal protection of the
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
At final hearing the District Court sustained the act, and dismissed the
bills. On appeal;-Held: Reversed. The court is not bound by the title or
description of the tax in the act, in determining its nature and effect. The
tax in substance is merely an excise on the activity of making a sale. Al-
though the lower court found that "generally speaking" there was a rela-
tion between gross sales and net profits, the evidence indicates no constancy
of progression, nor even a rough uniformity within wide limits of tolerance,
and the application of different rates based solely on the volume of sales
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receipts is unequal and arbitrary. Even if the tax be considered an excise
on the privilege of merchandizing at retail, the classification remains arbi-
trary, since no reasonable relation is discoverable between the amount de-
manded and the privilege enjoyed. Hence the act denies the equal protection
of the laws and is unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Cardozo, dissenting, con-
tended that a respectable body of statistical evidence supported the theory
that, despite occasional aberrations, gross sales bear a direct relation to net
gain and net worth, or more simply, that capacity to pay increases, by and
large, with an increase of receipts. It is further asserted that the relation
remains constant even when the increase is expressed in terms of correlated
percentages. This relation justifies the discrimination incident to the gradu-
ation of the tax rate. It is not the function of the court to be arbiter between
competing economic theories professed by honest men on grounds not wholly
frivolous. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Leivis (1934) 79 L. Ed. Adv. Op. 539.
The antipodal disagreement between the majority and the dissenting
opinions in this case is not founded upon a variance in legal principles, but
is a difference of minds concerning the weight to be accorded conflicting
economic theories. The legal principle is static. In general, to be in har-
mony with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, classi-
fication for tax purposes must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. The Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell (1930) 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 838; Ohio
Oil Co. v. Conway (1930) 281 U. S. 146; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin (1926)
270 U. S. 230; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Va. (1919) 253 U. S. 412; Black,
Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 1897) pp. 391-395; Cooley, Taxation (4th ed.
1924) pp. 259, 269. The application of this principle, like the interpretation
of the "due process" clause of the United States Constitution, is largely a
matter of judicial inclusion and exclusion, based upon the peculiar facts of
the individual case. The economic theory, rejected here by the majority
as a substantial basis for the condemned classification, is that "capacity to
pay increases with the increase of receipts", or that there is a definite rela-
tion between gross sales and net profit. In support of this proposition the
dissenting opinion adduces the following authorities: Harvard Bureau of
Business Research, Bulletins 74, 78, 83, and 85 (This authority advances the
more significant thesis that the increment may be expressed in terms of a
proportional percentage increase); Haig and Shoup, The Sales Tax in the
American States, Columbia University Press (1934) pp. 159, et seq.; Moore
v. State Bd. of Charities and Correction (1931) 239 Ky. 729, 40 S. W. (2nd)
349, and texts cited. For the contrary view that such a relation is variable,
and that the highest percentages of profit are earned when capital and
sales are moderate, see: Epstein, Industrial Profits in the United States
(1934) pp. 45, 46, 131, 132. However, this authority does not deny that on
the average the net earnings increase absolutely, though not proportionately,
as the sales increase in volume. It is also pertinent to remember that the
act creates no discrimination between sales within each bracket.
The instant decision is the latest adjudication resulting from the states'
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legislation generated against the "chain-stores" early in the decade. See:
Krueger, The Tax of the Chain Stores (1933) 11 Tax Mag. 412-415, 440-
441; Jacoby, Conflicting Interpretations of Retail Sales Laws (1934) 2
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 78-98; Note (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 432, 437, and stats.
cited; Becker and Hess, The Chain Store License Tax (1929) 7 N. Ca. L.
Rev. 113; Comment (1932) 12 B. U. L. Rev. 174; Legis. (1931) 31 Col.
L. R. 35; Legis. (1931) 44 Harv. L. R. 456, 1295; Legis. (1931) U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 289; Comment (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 431; Note (1934) 43 Yale L. J.
1022. The disposition of the court, as reflected in the relevant precedents,
has been generally tolerant towards this "emergency" legislation. See:
State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson (1930) 283 U. S. 527; Louis K. Liggett Co. v.
Lee (1932) 288 U. S. 517; Fox v. Standard Oil Co. No. 69, Oct. term 1934,
decided Jan. 14, 1935, 293 U. S.-, ante 339. (All of these cases sustained
the classification of chain stores for taxation at rates higher than those
applicable to single stores, and graduated upward on each store as the total
number of units in one ownership increased). Clark v. Titusville (1901)
184 U. S. 329 (Here a license tax was sustained, the rate varying progres-
sively with the amount of gross sales). Cf.: Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chi-
cago (1912) 228 U. S. 61; Pacific American Fisheries v. Alaska (1925) 269
U. S. 269; Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (1890) 142 U. S. 217; Dow v.
Beidelman (1887) 125 U. S. 680; Chi., etc. R. Co. v. Iowa (1875) 94 U. S.
155, 164; Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain (1903) 192 U. S. 397;
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. (1922) 260 U. S. 245; Louisville Gas and
E. Co. v. Coleman (1927) 277 U. S. 32. In general, these cases ilustrate
that there may be classification for tax purposes according to the nature
of the business, its size, and those factors of which size is an exponent.
In view of these decisions it is clear that if the soundness of the rejected
economic maxim were postulated, and the classification sanctioned, the re-
sult would in no wise be a startling anacoluthon in the sequence of judicial
expression. In truth, the majority view seems more of an anomaly than
the dissenting opinion, in the light of the modern juristic resource to the
oracle of Economics. In sustaining the tax in the case of State Tax Comrs.
v. Jackson (supra), the court stressed the advantages incident to the con-
duct of multiple stores, and the obvious differences in chain store methods
of merchandizing as contrasted with those practiced in the operation of a
single store. In Clark v. Titusville (supra), the purpose was to charge a
larger license fee to a larger business. In the Metropolis Theatre Co.
case (supra), the court sustained the exaction of a larger license fee from
theatres charging a higher price for tickets than from those charging lower
prices. If the additional advantages concededly attending the larger busi-
ness in those cases had no relation to net profit, what was the justification
for the discrimination? The court did not state that the sanction was a
"greater capacity to pay," but it assumed that fact without the aid of the
statistical evidence available in the case at bar. At p. 69 of the Metropolis
Theatre Co. case (supra) the court said: "It will immediately occur upon
the most casual reflection that the distinction the theatre itself makes is not
artificial and must have some relation to the success and ultimate profit of
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its business. In other words there is a natural relation between the price
of admission and revenue, some advantage certainly that determines the
choice .... " If such a debatable generality could be adopted without argu-
ment it is obscure why the court should later blind itself to a statistical
record in denying the existence of a calculated relationship between the
volume of sales and the net return. It is submitted that the above decisions
together with the statistical evidence presented in the lower court provide
a reasonable and logical basis upon which the present act might have been
sustained. It is significant, perhaps, to note that the Kentucky legislature
anticipated the judicial mood with remarkable accuracy, and shortly bef ore
this act was held unconstitutional, resorted to a flat tax on sales. Ky. Acts,
Spec. Sess. (1934) c. 25.
A. J. B. '36.
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